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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*


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15 DECEMBER 1971  
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This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

## W A R N I N G

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 6 - 12 DECEMBER 1971

Moscow (2804 items)

Polish Party Congress	(1%)	16%
[Brezhnev Speeches	(--)	9%]
India-Pakistan Conflict	(3%)	12%*
China	(6%)	9%*
Mars 2 & 3 Probes	(2%)	7%
Yemeni President in USSR	(--)	3%
European Security	(7%)	3%
Kosygin in Norway	(0.1%)	3%
Indochina	(3%)	2%

Peking (1655 items)

India-Pakistan Conflict	(17%)	60%
Domestic Issues	(27%)	14%
Indochina	(11%)	7%
[Cambodia	(4%)	6%]
Middle East	(5%)	3%
PRC-Senegal Diplomatic Relations Established	(--)	3%
ROK Declaration of National Emergency	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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\* The China figure excludes commentaries on China's role in the Indo-Pakistani conflict. These commentaries are counted in the figure on India-Pakistan and amount to roughly a third of the total on the conflict.

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## INDIA - PAKISTAN

### MOSCOW DEFENDS POLICY AS PEKING PORTRAYS SOVIET ISOLATION

Reacting to the political isolation reflected in its resounding defeat on a UN General Assembly vote, Moscow markedly stepped up efforts to defend its policy on the Indian-Pakistani conflict and to counter Peking's polemical thrusts by charging the Chinese with betraying the national liberation movement. Moscow's intensified propaganda campaign coincided with new consultations with the Indians and followed a possible top-level Soviet review of policy to prepare for the next stage of developments.

The Chinese in the meantime have greatly reduced their propaganda attention to the conflict from the extraordinary level reached during the period of three successive PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles from 6 to 8 December. In effect minimizing their stake in the conflict while seeking to capitalize on Moscow's relative isolation in the international community on this issue, the Chinese have focused on the United Nations as a means of bringing pressure in Pakistan's behalf. Significantly, the most authoritative Peking comment in the past week, a speech by Acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei on 9 December and a Commentator article on the 10th, directed attention to the United Nations and called for Indian compliance with the UNGA resolution.

The positions taken by Moscow and Peking represent the reverse in certain respects of their respective stands at the time of the 1965 Indian-Pakistani war. In 1965 the Soviet Union, not the PRC, applauded the ceasefire and withdrawal proposals sponsored by the United Nations; China, not the Soviet Union, invoked the revolutionary rights of oppressed peoples to fight for national self-determination (in Kashmir); and Moscow sought to assume a neutral posture and to play a mediatory role. In both 1965 and this year, Moscow's major moves took the form of TASS statements and messages from the Soviet leaders. Moscow's efforts in 1965 culminated the following January with the Tashkent meeting mediated by Premier Kosygin.

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With the signing of a "friendship" treaty with India last August, Moscow discarded efforts made earlier in the year to sustain a neutral stance in the evolving conflict. Moscow has taken care, however, to avoid citing the treaty--termed "a military alliance" by Peking--in defining its interests in the present situation, a reticence in accord with its demand that there be no outside involvement in the conflict.

While Peking has bitterly decried Moscow's geopolitical interests in the current conflict, the Chinese involvement in the 1965 war took a more authoritative and direct form. On 7 September 1965, the day after open warfare erupted, the PRC issued a government statement calling Indian actions "a grave threat to peace in this part of Asia" and warning that "India's aggression against any one of its neighbors concerns all of its neighbors." Citing an alleged threat to Chinese territory along the PRC-Sikkim border, the statement said the PRC Government was closely following "the development of India's act of aggression" and would strengthen its defenses. A series of foreign ministry notes pressing charges regarding border violations included an ultimatum demanding that India dismantle certain installations. In the current conflict, however, Peking has not reported any official government statements or notes nor publicized any diversionary moves against India.

#### MOSCOW INSISTS ON POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN EAST PAKISTAN

After offering little comment for several days after the intensification of Indian-Pakistani hostilities on 3 December, the Soviet press since 9 December has carried a stream of commentaries defending Soviet policy in great detail, charging Sino-U.S. collusion, and edging ever closer to acknowledgment of Bangla Desh as a government separate from Pakistan. Articles in PRAVDA by senior Soviet commentators Mayevskiy (on the 9th) and Zhukov (on the 10th), both transmitted textually by TASS, were followed by thematically similar articles in IZVESTIYA, RED STAR, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, and TRUD over the next several days.

This spate of press comment followed a possible top-level assessment and formulation of Soviet policy at the present juncture\* and coincided with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov's departure for Delhi and the arrival in Moscow of an Indian foreign affairs official. Consistent with Moscow's current practice, Soviet reports on these consultations did

\* Brezhnev's apparent absence from the Polish party congress proceedings he was attending, giving rise to speculation that he was conferring on South Asia, is documented in the TRENDS section of the FBIS report of 15 December 1971.

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not acknowledge that they were pursuant to provisions of the Soviet-Indian treaty.

Also at this time, Afghanistan's King Mohammed Zahir Shah arrived in Moscow on 13 December for a previously unannounced "unofficial friendly visit"--he was in Moscow only three months ago for a five-day official visit--and immediately conferred with Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin on "the key problems of the international situation, including the developments in the Hindustan subcontinent." At a dinner for the king on the 13th, Podgornyy noted the mutual concern of their two countries "in direct proximity of the areas of the present conflicts" and expressed pleasure "that Afghanistan displays a level-headed and reasonable approach to the solution of complex international questions, a striving for a political settlement of problems arising in the Asian continent." In his reply, the Afghan king thanked "our Soviet friends" for their understanding of Afghanistan's concern "over the sanguinary events and crisis in the Hindustan subcontinent." The king arrived home on the 14th, the same day that Delhi radio reported "a recent statement" by the Afghan prime minister expressing Afghanistan's "full sympathy for the refugees and afflicted people of Bangla Desh."

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT      The principal press commentaries have repeatedly and painstakingly detailed the historical background of the Indian-Pakistani conflict in an effort to defend Moscow's stand in the wake of the overwhelming UNGA vote (104-11) on 7 December calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal. The long-standing Soviet demand that the Pakistani Government take "effective actions" with the aim of a political settlement in East Pakistan, "immediately recognizing the will of the population of East Pakistan that found expression during the elections in December 1970," has been coupled with a call for "all parties concerned" to cease all military actions immediately. These two points are "inseparably connected," Soviet commentators stress.

Defending the Soviet position, PRAVDA commentator Mayevskiy on 9 December asserted that the original sin was that of "British imperialism" while the "main reason" for the current conflict was the actions of the Pakistani Government. Mayevskiy charged U.S.-Chinese collusion at the United Nations in favor of steps which would mean "perpetuation" of the conflict and would "sidestep the main question--that of the position of millions of people of East Pakistan."

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Noting that "a number of the UN members try to separate the question about the ceasefire in Hindustan from the need for a political settlement," Mayevskiy declared that "these two questions form a single whole." In a similar vein, Zhukov wrote the next day that although many UN delegates "voted with the best of intentions" for the ceasefire resolution, the "hysteria and misinformation that are being artificially whipped up in the lobbies and in the hall of the UN" caused them to overlook the fact that the resolution "actually contained the seeds of further aggravation of the conflict by saying nothing about a political settlement of the crisis in East Pakistan." Likewise, Kudryavtsev in the 12 December IZVESTIYA declared that "the question of an end to military operations cannot be separated from that of a political settlement in East Pakistan," adding that "the weakness of the UN resolution" lies in seeking to resolve "the first question while brushing the second aside."

Supporting the Soviet contention that a political settlement in the East favorable to the Bengali population would alleviate Indian-Pakistani tensions, TASS on 10 December cited a Press Trust of India report that "the first groups of refugees are beginning to return home in connection with the liberation of East Pakistani villages and cities from West Pakistani troops." And TASS in its own report from Delhi on 13 December cited a plan for "the repatriation of East Bengali citizens" to "the liberated districts of East Bengal."

BANGLA DESH While Moscow has given no formal indication that it is prepared to follow India's lead in recognizing the Bangla Desh regime, Soviet comment is not averse to referring to the "government" of Bangla Desh. Thus, both Mayevskiy and Kudryavtsev, in explaining the development of the "national liberation movement" in East Pakistan, noted that "the government of Bangla Desh emerged," and a participant in the 12 December Moscow radio observers' roundtable program commented on the U.S. desire to suppress the "liberation movement" by the people "of the state of Bangla Desh." TASS on 15 December cited an ADN interview with Abu Said Choudhury, "head of the delegation sent by the Bangla Desh Government to the UN," for the Bangla Desh Government's "main prerequisites" for the restoration of peace in the region: "withdrawal of the Pakistani Army from the Bangla Desh territory, recognition of the Government of Bangla Desh, and release of Sheik Mujibur Rahman." Similarly, Soviet media have recently referred to "Bengalis" and "East Bengal" rather than "East Pakistanis" and "East Pakistan" when discussing the eastern wing of Pakistan.

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U.S., PRC ROLE      While elaborately defending the Soviet stand, Moscow has repeatedly attacked "Washington's one-sided position" on the Indian-Pakistani conflict and "the clearly 'anti-Indian line' followed by American officials." Besides reporting mass anti-U.S. demonstrations in India and domestic U.S. opposition--including press comment and statements by Congressional leaders--to the Administration's "allegedly 'neutral' policy," Moscow has sought to document a pro-Pakistani bias on the part of Washington and has charged the Administration with exerting economic and military pressure on India. Thus, TASS reported from Washington on the 14th that the United States "is making new efforts to assist Pakistani authorities in the war against India," citing a Washington POST report that a special White House group under Kissinger "has been instructed to explore ways of assistance to Pakistan."

Moscow has taken particular note of the movement of U.S. Seventh Fleet ships into the Bay of Bengal, characterizing this as "gross blackmail" and "psychological pressure" on India. Dismissing the "pretext" that they are being sent to insure "the so-called evacuation of American and other foreign nationals from East Pakistan," Moscow radio on the 14th pointed out that the U.S. aircraft carrier Enterprise--among the ships approaching the crisis area--has on board Phantom fighters "that have taken part in raids on Vietnam and Laos."

Thus far Soviet media have not mentioned Western news reports, publicized by Delhi radio on the 15th, that President Nixon has threatened to cancel his proposed visit to Moscow next May unless the Soviet Government "changes its stand" on the crisis "within the next few days." On the other hand, Moscow has sought to play on the theme of Sino-U.S. collusion by taking note of Pakistan's role in connection with the President's forthcoming visit to China. A KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article by Yefremov on the 12th noted that Kissinger "made his secret flight to Peking" from Pakistan, adding that Pakistani leaders consider "they have a right to count on the special gratitude of both Peking and Washington for Pakistan's participation in their first political contacts." Also along this line both Zhukov and a participant in the 12 December observers' round-table program wryly noted that Pakistani President Yahya Khan had recently invited President Nixon to visit Pakistan on his way to Peking or on his return trip from China.

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Similarly, Soviet comment on UN deliberations on the Indian-Pakistani question has taken pains to portray Sino-U.S. collusion in obtaining UN action favorable to Pakistan and ignoring the realities of the political situation on the subcontinent. Commentator Nikitin, in TRUD on 12 December, stated that "it is no accident that in the first voting in the UN Security Council with the PRC participating the Peking delegate was in the same camp as the U.S. delegate." Contending that the Chinese have "betrayed the cause of the national liberation struggle," Atlivannikov in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 11 December sought to score points in the third world by observing that the first PRC veto in the UN, used to reject a Soviet resolution, "has aroused profound indignation not only in Delhi but also in the capitals of other developing countries, among whom Peking claims 'special authority.'"

Besides depicting Sino-U.S. collusion, Moscow's attack on Peking's role in the South Asian conflict has hit hard at what Moscow terms the Chinese "betrayal of the national liberation movement" in East Bengal. Moscow has repeatedly charged, particularly in Mandarin broadcasts to Chinese listeners, that Peking media have ignored the mass repression of civil rights in East Pakistan by the Pakistani authorities. According to PRAVDA's Mayevskiy, Peking has followed a two-faced policy toward the events of the subcontinent, "advocating 'people's war'" in East Pakistan while concurrently "advertising its support for the military regime in Pakistan, striving to turn it into an instrument of its chauvinist, great-power course in Asia." TASS commentator Kharkov on 13 December said "the present struggle of the population of East Pakistan has all the features of a national liberation movement of a people against its oppressors." He went on to argue that in opposing this movement the Peking leaders demonstrated that they are "absolutely indifferent to the fates of the oppressed peoples" and are "worrying only about subjugating to their hegemony the national liberation movements." Nikitin in TRUD on 12 December concluded that the policy of the "Maoists" in Hindustan is that of "setting Asians on Asians and fulfilling the main thesis of the 'Nixon doctrine.'"

#### PEKING SEES SOVIETS, INDIANS IN "UNPRECEDENTED ISOLATION"

In a situation in which its client is suffering military reversals but in which the Chinese are notably loathe to increase their commitment in the conflict, Peking has directed attention to the United Nations in an effort to

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bring pressure on India and the Soviet Union to end the fighting. Thus, both the 10 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article--the most recent comment on this level--and Chi Peng-fei's speech on the 9th focused on the UNGA resolution calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal. Sounding a major theme in Peking's comment, Chi declared at a Tanzanian embassy reception that the UNGA vote "has landed social imperialism and Indian expansionism in unprecedented isolation."

Both Chi and Commentator lectured India on the wisdom of complying with the majority will of the world body. Chi advised India that "it had better honestly accept the resolution" and "not alienate itself from the people of the world." The Commentator article, entitled "Just Cause Enjoys Abundant Support While Unjust Cause Finds Little Support," warned "the Indian expansionists to sober down and carry out honestly the resolution." Acknowledging that Pakistan has met with "some temporary difficulties," Commentator found solace in the fact that Peking's friend "is winning more and more extensive sympathy and support." As for Peking's support, Commentator did not go beyond affirming that the Chinese Government and people "will resolutely carry out our duties inside and outside the United Nations" in supporting Pakistan's efforts to defend its "national sovereignty and territorial integrity." Peking's obligations were not specified.

An NCNA dispatch disseminated on 15 December, reporting the renewal of Security Council consideration of the conflict at the request of U.S. representative Bush, denounced Moscow for "abusing" its veto power by once again vetoing a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire. NCNA duly noted that the United States presented the resolution and that the PRC voted for it, though the dispatch also cited the Chinese delegate's reservations concerning this "highly unsatisfactory" resolution.

SUPERPOWER      Apart from reporting diplomatic moves in the  
POLITICS          United Nations, Peking has largely ignored the  
                    U.S. position in the South Asian conflict.

However, there have been occasional references to the United States--identified only as "another superpower"--in the context of discussions of the Soviet Union's geopolitical interests in the area. According to Peking, Moscow's aim in aiding India is to gain control over the entire subcontinent and the Indian Ocean in order "to contend with another superpower for world hegemony."

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The reference to Soviet-U.S. rivalry is a variation on Peking's standard formula on "collusion and contention" between the two superpowers. Variations on this formula, turning on the relative weight placed on the collusive and contentious elements, have been a significant indicator of Peking's policies toward the superpowers. Where Peking perceives a relative dominance of contentious elements, it takes a more flexible line toward one of the superpower rivals in order to maneuver between them. But in situations in which Peking portrays a Soviet-U.S. convergence of interests--as in the middle of 1969 when Peking said the two superpowers were jointly engaged in encircling the PRC--the Chinese are inclined to take a hard line toward both Moscow and Washington.\*

Some of the themes in the Sino-Soviet border conflict have appeared in Peking's attacks on Moscow's geopolitical interests in South Asia. Thus, Huang Hua, addressing the Security Council on the 6th, said one of the Soviet aims is to encircle China and to establish "a great empire which the old tsars craved after but were unable to realize, a great empire controlling the whole Eurasian continent." An NCNA report on the 11th, detailing the history of Soviet aid to India, recalled the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes in charging that India at that time had made "unbridled attacks" on China in coordination with the Soviets. The Sino-Soviet border also figured in an Albanian article on the Indian-Pakistani conflict which NCNA summarized on the 10th. NCNA quoted the article as saying the Soviets seek to create tension along China's southern border in order to encircle China with a ring of fire "not only from the north but also from the south."

Consistent with its references only to Soviet-U.S. contention and not to collusion, Peking's charges of Soviet encirclement have not accused the United States of abetting the Soviet effort.

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\* During the same recent period that PRC delegates were referring to Soviet-U.S. contention for hegemony in connection with South Asia, Chiao Kuan-hua's address to the UNGA on the Middle East question said "the two superpowers are contending and colluding with each other" in that area.

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## INDOCHINA

Ambassador Porter's proposal at the Paris talks on 9 December that the next session be held on the 23d instead of the 16th is assailed in a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 12th--the first comment on the talks since a 21 September NHAN DAN article complained that Porter's taking over as delegation head had not improved the prospects for progress. Commentator says the Ambassador's explanation that he was suggesting a postponement because the communist delegates had not replied to U.S. proposals was merely another attempt to avoid responding to the PRG's seven-point proposal.

A DRV Party Secretariat instruction on celebration of the December anniversaries--"Resistance Day," the founding of the NFLSV, and DRV Army Day--echoes recent propaganda in its confident evaluation of the military situation. Thus, claiming that the Indochinese people have achieved "very big victories" and are "facing bright prospects," it says that the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization have "sustained heavy setbacks and are heading toward total bankruptcy."

Vietnamese communist media report the convening on 14 December of the Third Congress of the Vietnam Fatherland Front--the first congress in 10 years. The decision to hold it some time in 1971 was taken at the 21st enlarged session of the Front Central Committee on 5-6 March this year. Truong Chinh addressed the congress, and Hoang Quoc Viet delivered the political report.

Peking support of the Vietnamese is again voiced in an NCNA report of a 13 December banquet hosted by the PRC Ambassador for Pham Van Dong upon his return from his visit to China--protocol consistent with that following Chou En-lai's Hanoi visit last March. According to the NCNA summary the PRC ambassador praised the visit as a new contribution to the "great friendship and militant unity" of the two countries. Reminding the Chinese of Vietnam's vanguard role, Pham Van Dong said the Vietnamese are keenly aware that their fight "is an important and direct contribution to the weakening of U.S. imperialism" which creates favorable conditions for all revolutionary causes. Inexplicably, VNA has not yet reported the banquet.

### PARIS TALKS: U.S. CALL FOR POSTPONEMENT LABELLED "SABOTAGE"

Ambassador Porter's proposal that the Paris talks be suspended--as he put it, to give the communists time "to develop a

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constructive approach" and to allow "communication with leaders in Hanoi"--prompted the first substantial Front as well as Hanoi comment on the talks in almost three months.\* The NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 12th was followed by an LPA commentary on the 13th. And in addition to the criticism of Porter's postponement suggestion by the delegates at the session on the 9th, Xuan Thuy assailed it in a message reporting on the Paris talks to the Third Congress of the Vietnam Fatherland Front currently meeting in Hanoi. Thuy's message was transmitted to Hanoi via VNA's service channel but at this writing has not been carried in DRV media.

The VNA account of the Paris session on the 9th totally obscured Porter's explanation of his call for postponement: It said only that the U.S. delegate "proposed to postpone the 139th session to December 23 under the pretext that it is unnecessary to meet on December 16." The NHAN DAN Commentator article, carried by VNA and Hanoi radio, purported to acknowledge Porter's reasoning when it represented him as having asked for the suspension "because the Vietnamese delegates did not reply to the U.S. proposals." Thus glossing over details of the Ambassador's remarks, the article concentrated on Xuan Thuy's rebuttal, saying he "pointed out that the 'proposals' to which Porter requested a reply were old ones: The problem of 'cease-fire' while the U.S. expeditionary troops continue occupying South Vietnam, the 'prisoner-of-war' problem which the United States has used to fool public opinion, and the problem of maintaining Thieu . . . ." Commentator observed that these "proposals" advanced by the President in October 1970 "have been exposed and rejected by the Vietnamese people and world opinion."

The LPA commentary ignored Porter's statement when it said that "in an attempt to make black white, the U.S. chief delegate proposed to postpone the next plenary session to December 23." The LPA commentary, which was also carried by VNA, echoed NHAN DAN in ridiculing "Nixon's worn-out 'on-the-spot cease-fire' proposal which has already been rejected." LPA said it was ridiculous to resort to tortuous arguments to

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\* The 21 September NHAN DAN Commentator article, which charged that neither the replacement of Bruce by Porter nor recent statements by the President had indicated any change in the U.S. attitude, is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 September 1971, pages 1-3.

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avoid answering the "logical" PRG proposal, and NHAN DAN's Commentator observed that the PRG proposals "put forward a correct solution to the problems of general concern, including a cease-fire and the release of captured U.S. military men."

NHAN DAN's Commentator was again critical of President Nixon's 12 November press conference remarks, saying he "brazenly declared" that he would "continue the 'Vietnamization of the war' plan and maintain the Saigon puppet administration." But it was left to the LPA commentary to go into the "contradictions" between Vietnamization and negotiations. LPA, like Xuan Thuy at the session on the 9th, said that these are "two contradictory" policies. The commentary observed that "as the American press has put it, Vietnamization of the war and negotiations are two contradictory points in Nixon's policy, and since such contradiction has not yet been solved, he is finding himself in an impasse." The VNA account quoted Xuan Thuy as asking at the Paris session: "Since from a policy point of view, Vietnamization means prolonging and expanding the war, how can it get along with serious negotiations on the settlement of the Vietnam issue?"

The NHAN DAN Commentator article took the same tack as the one of 21 September in insisting that the Nixon Administration has consistently sabotaged the Paris talks. Thus, Commentator now recalled that in 1970 the Administration had "for months" refused to appoint a chief delegate and remarked that when Bruce was finally appointed he came with an empty suitcase. Commentator concluded that "on Nixon's orders" Porter has now "openly sabotaged" the Paris talks.

#### DRV SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S. AIR STRIKES, LAUDS DOWNING OF PLANE

In the latest of Hanoi's continuing series of protests, the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 11 December charged that U.S. aircraft had struck at a number of places in Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces on the 10th, and at Huong Lap village in the demilitarized zone "belonging to the DRV" from the 6th to the 10th. Claiming that the attacks caused "losses in lives and property," the spokesman "severely condemned U.S. war acts" and demanded an end to all acts of encroachment upon the DRV's sovereignty and security.

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Prior to the release of the protest, Hanoi radio on the 10th had reported the downing of an F-4 that day, bringing Hanoi's total of claimed downed planes to 3,403. And the foreign ministry spokesman's statement said that the "U.S. aggressors had been duly punished" by the downing of a plane by the "armed forces and people of Quang Binh." The broadcast on the 10th recalled Hanoi's claim that two U.S. planes were downed last month in Nghe An.\* Hanoi has of course made no reference to the massive rescue attempt involving more than 40 aircraft which rescued the injured pilot of the downed plane. Neither has it mentioned a missing second crewman.

#### DRV PARTY ISSUES INSTRUCTION ON CELEBRATION OF ANNIVERSARIES

Hanoi media on 12 December publicized an instruction issued the previous day by the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Secretariat on the celebration of three upcoming anniversaries: Resistance Day on 19 December, the 20 December anniversary of the founding of the NFLSV, and DRV Army (VPA) Day on 22 December. A similar instruction was issued by the Secretariat on 6 December 1969, but none appeared last year. Propaganda on the anniversaries last year was centered on the 10 December appeal for stepped-up efforts from the VWP Central Committee and the DRV Government--issued in the wake of the heavy November U.S. air attacks on the DRV and the unsuccessful effort to rescue U.S. prisoners at Son Tay.

The current instruction is prefaced with a routine, confident evaluation of the communist position--claiming that the Indochinese people have "recorded very big victories" and are "facing bright prospects" and that the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization have "sustained heavy setbacks and are heading toward total bankruptcy." It warns that the United States is still carrying out Vietnamization and "prolonging" the war, but maintains that the allies are "in a losing and passive position" while the communists "are in a winning and offensive

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\* U.S. press reports on the shooting down of the U.S. plane on the 10th said that it was the first in more than eight months--a reference apparently to the 21-22 March period of concentrated U.S. air strikes. See the TRENDS of 24 March 1971, pages 9-11. Since that period, Hanoi has claimed a total of 17 planes downed over the DRV.

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posture and are on the upswing." It calls for the anniversaries to be used to mobilize the people to persist and "record bigger victories" leading to "total victory." The 1969 instruction was briefer and more reserved in its appraisal of the communists' "great and comprehensive achievements" and promise to "persevere in and step up our fight until complete victory."

Listing military as well as propaganda tasks for the anniversaries, the instruction calls for increased combat readiness and efforts to "bring assistance to the frontline and to strengthen the rear base." It declares, among other things, that "in the immediate future it is necessary to properly carry out the conscription, communications, and transportation tasks to serve the frontline" and "to properly carry out the air defense task." The 1969 instruction made no specific reference to conscription and only referred to the frontline in urging activities to "encourage everyone to look to the frontline." Like the 1969 instruction, the current one also calls for fulfillment of the annual state plan and preparation for next year's plan.

#### VIETNAM FATHERLAND FRONT HOLDS FIRST CONGRESS IN TEN YEARS

Hanoi media are publicizing the convening of the Third Congress of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) on 14 December, with no indication so far of how long it will last. The decision to hold the congress some time in 1971 was made at the 21st enlarged session of the VFF Central Committee in early March this year.\* Propaganda at that time observed that it had been 10 years since the Second Congress. This is recalled now in a brief history of the VFF, carried by VNA on the 14th, which also notes that the first congress was held in September 1955. The first available propaganda indication that the congress was convening came on 11 December in VNA's review of the Hanoi press, which said the papers "announced the holding of the preparatory meeting of the Third Congress of the Vietnam Fatherland Front." A report in VNA's Vietnamese-language transmissions on the 14th said that on the previous

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\* The VFF Central Committee session is discussed in a 16 March 1971 Supplement to the TRENDS, page 8.

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day the Front Central Committee held its 22d session under Chairman Ton Duc Thang to adopt the plan to hold the Third Congress, which would be attended by some 460 delegates.

Hanoi reports on the proceedings of the opening session of the congress on the 14th say that the purpose of the congress is "to review the Front's activities over the past decade since its second congress, draw experiences," determine future tasks, and appoint a new VFF Central Committee. Opening remarks at the session were made by DRV President Ton Duc Thang, who is also chairman of the VFF Central Committee. Politburo member Truong Chinh read the message of greetings from the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Central Committee. Premier Pham Van Dong is the only other VWP Politburo member mentioned as attending the congress.

Hoang Quoc Viet read a political report to the congress entitled "Strengthen Unity and Be Determined to Completely Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and Successfully Build Socialism," the text of which is only partially available in translation at this writing. Part One of the three-part report reviews various achievements of the Vietnamese people and scores President Nixon for being "increasingly stubborn, bellicose, and crafty" and "putting forth the so-called peace initiative aimed at deceiving public opinion" while carrying out Vietnamization. The report also expresses gratitude for socialist countries' "many-sided and effective assistance" and specifically names the Soviet Union and China in this context.

The VWP Central Committee message, read by Truong Chinh, also scores the "bellicosity" of the Nixon Administration and the continuation of Vietnamization. The "foremost task" of the nation, the message reaffirms, is to fight against U.S. aggression. This task, it says, "requires that our entire people make intense efforts to materialize President Ho's sacred testament, persist in the struggle on the three fronts, military, political, and diplomatic, push forward the anti-U.S. resistance for national salvation until complete victory, with a firm resolve to liberate the South, defend and build the socialist North, and proceed to the peaceful reunification of the fatherland."

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DELEGATES FROM VNA reported on the 10th that delegations to  
SOUTH VIETNAM the congress from the NFLSV and the Alliance  
had arrived in Hanoi, without indicating the  
date of arrival. VNA noted, however, that they were received  
on the 12th by President Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh, and Hoang  
Quoc Viet. The delegations are headed, respectively, by  
NFLSV Central Committee Presidium member Nguyen Van Ngoi and  
by Lam Van Tet, vice chairman of the Vietnam Alliance Central  
Committee and member of the PRG advisory council. Liberation  
Radio announced the composition of the delegations in reporting  
on the 13th that they had "left for Hanoi."

#### CAMBODIA: VICTORIES CLAIMED OVER ARVN, PHNOM PENH FORCES

Communist media continue to report "victories" in Cambodia, among  
other things acclaiming the capture on 11 December of the Phnom  
Penh government position at Baset Hill--eight miles northwest  
of the capital--and the seizure on 6 December of the town of  
Bat Doeng. Feats of the Cambodian People's National Liberation  
Armed Forces (CNPLAF) over ARVN troops have also been claimed  
and were given particular attention in the Hanoi press on  
14 December. An article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN that day praised  
the CNPLAF for having "completely routed" an ARVN task force,  
on 10 December, in the Dam Be-Wat Thmey area of Kompong Cham  
Province. The paper and other propaganda claimed that more  
than 550 Saigon troops were "exterminated," 14 aircraft downed,  
and 70 tanks and armored cars destroyed. The "new heavy setback"  
for the ARVN, according to the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, "has  
aggravated the critical situation of the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak  
clique, has dealt a heavier blow at the declining morale of the  
Phnom Penh and Saigon puppet armies, and has seriously foiled  
the U.S.-puppets' defense-in-depth tactic in South Vietnam."

Sihanouk's clandestine radio continues to call upon Cambodian  
Government soldiers to defect and upon citizens to evacuate to  
"liberated areas." A particularly inflammatory broadcast on  
the 10th opened with the prediction that the "doomsday" of the  
Lon Nol regime is drawing near and with the claim that the  
government's troops "have been routed and killed like flies  
on all fronts throughout Cambodia." It later raised the  
specter of attacks on the cities: "Our armed forces have  
arrived at the gates of Phnom Penh. They are surrounding Kompong  
Cham town. Kompong Thom and Siem Reap towns are isolated, while  
Kompong Chhnang, Pursat, and Battambang towns are being cut off  
from Phnom Penh by our armed forces. Kampot, Takeo, Svay Rieng,  
and Prey Veng are under siege."

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## ASIAN UNITY STRESSED DURING CAMBODIAN VISIT TO DPRK

A delegation of Sihanouk's front (FUNK) and government (RGNU) arrived in Pyongyang on 10 December for an unheralded visit at the invitation of the DPRK Government. The delegation, led by Ieng Sary, "special envoy of the interior part" of the RGNU, includes a number of FUNK Politburo members and RGNU ministers. Ieng Sary has been playing a prominent coordinating role--between the pro-Sihanouk Cambodian forces in the field and those based in Peking, between the Cambodians and the Vietnamese, and now between the Cambodians and the North Koreans. Ieng Sary arrived in Peking from the Cambodian "frontlines" last August, and he headed a FUNK-RGNU delegation which visited Hanoi from 10 to 17 November.\*

Enjoying high-level treatment during its visit to Pyongyang, the delegation was met at the airport by First Vice Premier Kim Il and was hosted at a banquet on the 10th by President Choe Yong-kon and Kim Il. The chairman of the Pyongyang municipal people's committee and Ieng Sary addressed a Pyongyang mass rally held to greet the delegation on 13 December; Second Vice Premier Pak Song-chol, who led a DPRK delegation to Hanoi in October, was present at the rally. On the 11th, the Cambodian group had talks with Kim Il and other DPRK leaders, including the minister of finance and vice ministers of foreign affairs and national defense. According to KCNA, "questions of common concern" were discussed and "a complete unanimity of views" was reached.

The theme of Asian unity has been prominent in the propaganda so far. A 10 December NODONG SINMUN editorial greeting the arrival of the delegation cited Kim Il-song's statement that "the people of Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia" and "all other revolutionary countries in Asia" should consolidate their "anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. united front" and deal a "collective counterblow" to U.S. aggression in Asia. The Korean speaker at the Pyongyang rally similarly quoted Kim Il-song. But Kim Il, speaking at the banquet on the 10th, said only that the visit will help consolidate the friendship and solidarity of the two peoples and also to strengthen "the solidarity of the revolutionary peoples of Asia."

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\* Ieng Sary's arrival in Peking is discussed in the TRENDS of 1 September, pages 8-10, and his visit to Hanoi in the TRENDS of 17 November, pages 8-10.

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At the banquet Ieng Sary restricted himself to praising bilateral solidarity, according to the KCNA summary of his speech, but at the rally he asserted that the Cambodian people are joining in the "concerted efforts" for the strengthening of "militant solidarity" with the peoples of Korea, China, Vietnam, and Laos and "other revolutionary peoples of Asia and the world people."

The Korean speakers praised the Cambodian people's struggle, singling out the recent victories on Highway 6, and promised continued "active support, material and moral," as well as reiterating support for the various peace plans put forward by the Indochinese communists. Ieng Sary in turn thanked the North Koreans for their assistance and expressed support for Pyongyang's eight-point stand on reunification of Korea. Scoring the United States and the Pak Chong-hui "clique" for "new schemes" to provoke a war in Korea, he expressed support for the 7 December DPRK Foreign Ministry statement denouncing the ROK's proclamation of a state of emergency.\*

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\* On 14 December NCNA carried a RGNU Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement supporting the DPRK statement. Other reaction to the ROK's 6 December declaration of a state of emergency is discussed in another section of this TRENDS.

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## K O R E A

## PYONGYANG DENOUNCES ROK'S STATE OF EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION

Pyongyang denounced ROK President Pak Chong-hui's 6 December proclamation of a state of emergency and his accompanying "statement" with a flurry of authoritative comment accusing him of aggravating the situation in Korea and trying to kindle a new war to extricate himself from domestic difficulties and block peaceful reunification of the country. Pyongyang repeated denials that it plans an attack on the South, as charged by Pak, and stressed its proposals for "peaceful" reunification. The propaganda includes a 7 December DPRK Foreign Ministry statement, a press conference by the director of the information department of the foreign ministry on the 8th, and a NODONG SINMUN editorial on the 9th.\* The official Pyongyang comment is supplemented by a statement by the central committee of the South Korean Revolutionary Party for Reunification, the so-called Marxist-Leninist party leading the South Korean struggle, carried by the clandestine Voice of the Revolutionary Party for Reunification on the 9th.

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION      The DPRK Foreign Ministry statement noted that Pak proclaimed the state of emergency "on the pretext of 'a sudden change in the international situation' and the fictitious threat of southward aggression from the North.'" But none of the propaganda acknowledged that Pak said the "change" in the international situation included the seating of the PRC in the United Nations, nor did it mention President Nixon's forthcoming trip to China. Last August Pyongyang welcomed the trip as demonstrating a U.S. surrender to the revolutionary forces.

The closest Pyongyang has come to specifying the changing facts of international life underlying the ROK emergency proclamation was a remark about the Nationalist Chinese by the director of the DPRK Foreign Ministry's information department in his 8 December press conference. He said Pak is uneasy "seeing the 'miserable lot' of the Chiang Kai-shek

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\* Comment on the state of emergency in the ROK was preceded by a KCNA "authorized statement" of 5 December, similarly denouncing earlier ROK "war provocation maneuvers" and warnings of a threat of aggression from the North.

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clique" who were "thrown away like a worn-out sandal some time ago by the U.S. imperialists, their masters." The statement by the Revolutionary Party for Reunification, which was not reported in official DPRK media, said that the political and military strength of the PRC has grown and its international position improved. It did not specifically mention the UN seating of the PRC but it did add that the Chiang "clique" was "expelled from the United Nations and has become a pitiable orphan in the international community."

Pyongyang alluded to Pak's expression of concern that arguments in the U.S. Congress over foreign aid and study of further U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea indicate that the ROK cannot rely on the United States forever and must take responsibility for its own security. The DPRK Foreign Ministry statement said that the Pak "clique" is in despair because the United States is facing "a serious political, economic, and military crisis" and is "going into irretrievable bankruptcy and decline internationally." The spokesman at the press conference said that the South Korean economy is facing a "catastrophic situation" because of the U.S. "economic crisis." The NODONG SINMUN editorial included a reference to the Nixon Doctrine in portraying the United States as being in a difficult position throughout the world, especially in Asia. The Americans, it said, "are clinging to a more cunning and adventuresome policy under the Nixon Doctrine, but this policy is also going bankrupt." The statement by the Revolutionary Party for Reunification similarly mentioned the Nixon Doctrine.

KOREAN SITUATION      Pyongyang's comment charged that the proclamation is designed to suppress the "ever-growing" desire of the South Korean people for North-South negotiations and peaceful reunification of the country, and that it is aimed at deliberately aggravating the situation and starting a new war in Korea. Seeking to capitalize on sentiments favoring Korean detente, Pyongyang claimed that the ROK proclamation was timed with an eye on the Red Cross talks

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in Panmunjom, a timing that "proves" the ROK move was intended to "block the peaceful reunification of the country."\*

Denying Pak's charge that the North threatens southward invasion, the DPRK Foreign Ministry statement repeated that Pyongyang has always tried to solve the question of Korean reunification peacefully. "We have no intention to 'invade the South' and cannot have," the statement asserted. This assertion was echoed in followup comment and also appeared earlier in the 5 December KCNA statement. Similar denials of intent to invade the South have recurred in Pyongyang propaganda since at least the Korean War anniversary (25 June) in 1969 when the statement by public organizations--a customary feature of anniversary comment--said that "we have no intention of marching South; we have no intention of solving the question of Korean unification by force of arms." In reviewing North Korean proposals to move toward reunification, the spokesman at the press conference and the NODONG SINMUN editorial, but not the foreign ministry statement, recalled Kim Il-song's 6 August expression of readiness to hold negotiations with "all political parties in the South including the DRP."

Even while warning of the DPRK's determination to defend itself in the event that the United States and its "puppet" unleash a "new war," Pyongyang seemed to take pains to avoid provocative language. The NODONG SINMUN editorial, for example, recalled that because of enemy plots of "armed invasion" of the North, "we are inevitably compelled to enhance our efforts in increasing the defense capacity of the country and readjust the economic construction to some extent." But the editorial emphasized that the military might is "defensive" only, asserting that "we do not want to threaten others." Stronger language was used by the North Korean representative at the 11 December meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, a customary forum for vitriolic attacks on the United States and its "puppet."

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\* The Red Cross organizations of North and South Korea agreed on 14 August to pursue contacts to discuss the fate of families separated by the division of the country. "Preliminary" talks began on 20 September, in the course of which it was agreed that full-dress talks should be held alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang. However, after some 12 meetings, there has as yet been no agreement on the agenda for these talks or on the date they should begin. Developments leading up to the talks and the initial contacts are discussed in the TRENDS of 18 August, pages 27-32; 25 August, pages 40-42; and 9 September, pages 38-40.

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At the same time, some of the comment has taken note of U.S. statements to the effect that the United States does not share Pak's concern over the imminency of the DPRK threat. The NODONG SINMUN editorial noted that "even ruling circles in the United States" are describing the "hue and cry" over the danger of southward aggression "as political jockeying concocted by the Pak clique entirely due to the domestic situation." A similar comment appeared in an 8 December KCNA commentary on the state of emergency.

PEKING Peking supported the DPRK Foreign Ministry statement with a 9 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which, like Pyongyang's comment, noted that the ROK proclamation was made "on the pretext of a 'sudden change in the international situation' and the 'threat of southward aggression from the North.'" PEOPLE'S DAILY avoided any elaboration of the "changes" in the international situation. And it limited itself to echoing DPRK criticism of the Pak "clique" and expressing bland support for "the just struggle of the Korean people to frustrate the war provocation of the U.S.-Pak clique and attain the peaceful reunification of their fatherland." The paper did not proffer support, however, in charging that it is the "daily increasing acts of war provocation" by the Pak clique which are "seriously threatening the security of the DPRK."

MOSCOW Moscow supported Pyongyang as usual with only routine level comment including an 8 December PRAVDA article and an article in the 12 December RED STAR. Although the initial brief TASS report of the DPRK Foreign Ministry statement acknowledges that the "sudden change in the international situation" was one of the reasons for the proclamation of the state of emergency in the ROK, the comment does not mention this, concentrating on scoring Pak's charge that there is a "threat of attack from the North." PRAVDA said that even Washington did not support Seoul's "latest trick," citing a Reuters report that a State Department spokesman said that the United States had no information that the DPRK was planning an offensive against the South. PRAVDA said that Pak resorted to his "lies" in order to exacerbate tension on the Korean peninsula to counter the growing sentiments among the South Korean people against the U.S. "occupation" and for contacts between the North and South, as manifested in particular by the Red Cross talks.

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RED STAR commented similarly that the Seoul regime hopes to preserve itself by blocking peaceful reunification and "slandering" the DPRK which has consistently striven to end tension in Korea. RED STAR adds that the Pak clique would "not dare to behave so insolently if it were not for the support of the United States." Noting that the State Department spokesman said that the United States did not share the ROK's assessment of the DPRK threat, the article asks pointedly what use the United States has in mind for the ROK army which it is arming.

#### KIM IL-SONG LEADS PERSONAL TOUCH IN EDITING KCNA ITEMS

DPRK leader Kim Il-song's personality cult was further embellished by the director of KCNA in a report he delivered at a 5 December Pyongyang meeting marking the 25th anniversary of the news agency. Kim was present at the meeting. Elaborating on the premier's long-time personal involvement with DPRK news media and his "on-the-spot guidance" to KCNA, the director said that Kim has taken a direct part in the formulation and editing of major press items. "Each time an important event took place at home and abroad the leader gave minute teachings on the central idea, the system, contents, and titles of KCNA reports and statements, major commentaries and articles," according to the director, who added that Kim "read in person their immature manuscripts and corrected them one by one."

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## CHINA

## MODEL OPERA MAY BE TARGET OF ARTICLE IN RED FLAG

An article in RED FLAG No. 12 suggests that one offshoot of the current campaign to discredit the notion that "heroes" determine the course of history will be a revision of the rules for revolutionary drama adopted during the cultural revolution. It was Chiang Ching of course who took the leading role in guiding the creation of new plays, ballets, and operas that would serve the needs of the time. The RED FLAG article, published 1 November but only recently made available in translation, is clearly part of the current campaign against Lin Piao and his fellow "swindlers," but it may also necessitate a number of alterations in some of Mme. Mao's most cherished productions.

The RED FLAG article, by Chung An, is nominally aimed at a film entitled "The People's Huge Palms," but it lays down general guidance for revolutionary drama which seems at variance with the practice of the cultural revolution. Chung criticizes the film for "rejecting the leadership of the party" by allowing only a small number of heroes to stand out, with one of them so dominant that "he almost became the personification of the Party and the masses"; when he acted "no problem was insuperable." Chung explains that such a portrayal provides the wrong answer to the question, "Is history made by heroes or by slaves?"--a question that has been a touchstone in the recent campaign against Lin Piao. Chung also notes that "Liuists" have "attempted to cause certain organs of power to depart from the leadership of the Party and from the masses and to set up an independent kingdom opposed to the proletarian headquarters led by Chairman Mao."

These animadversions against dramatic "heroes" appear to be directly applicable to the Peking opera mainstay "Taking the Bandits' Stronghold" or--as it was retitled upon its release in a new and purer form in late 1969--"Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy." The revised version was performed on the occasion of the PRC's 20th anniversary in 1969; the text was published in RED FLAG No. 11 and in local papers; it was widely broadcast and became the subject of numerous laudatory articles. Several of these articles as well as the new text were published in CHINESE LITERATURE No. 1 for 1970.

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The focus of the commentary surrounding the new version was that drama must revolve around a single hero. One of the articles published in CHINESE LITERATURE, by the Peking Opera Troupe of Shanghai, was entitled "Strive to Create the Brilliant Images of Proletarian Heroes." The authors asserted emphatically that "the depiction of negative characters, positive characters other than the principal hero, and environment and atmosphere must unswervingly serve the purpose of giving prominence to the principal hero." This principle was spelled out definitively in three rules which stated that positive characters must receive prominence over negative, heroes over other positive characters, and the "principal hero" above all. The principal hero was said to be "representative of his class and the masses;" nothing at all was said about the CCP apart from the notation that in one scene the hero is shown "drawing inexhaustible strength from the party leadership and his comrades-in-arms."

A second article in the same issue of CHINESE LITERATURE, by Hung Cheng, may have reflected a degree of struggle at the time over the idea of "heroes" in drama. It paid lip service at least to the notion that one should not spend one's time singing the praises of "saviors," and it did observe that the PLA always adheres to the party line. But the author also declared that one must look for heroes in the present era, and he referred to Yang Tzu-jung, the principal hero of "Tiger Mountain," as an "artistic representative of thousands upon thousands of heroes of the Chinese PLA." In this article, and in another as well, it was noted that Lin Piao was the PLA leader in the struggle to free the northeast from Japan, a struggle represented in a small way by the battle for "Tiger Mountain."

The article associated Chiang Ching closely with the new version of "Tiger Mountain," and the Shanghai troupe's article went so far as to credit her with "direct leadership" and "personal participation." Thus it seems unlikely that there will be open attacks on the opera unless Chiang's role can be explained. It is possible that she was not the initiator of the 1969 revision. She had seemed to be declining in stature at the time, and had failed to make an appearance for several months prior to the opera's reissuance. There appeared to be no adequate reason for a further revision of the opera, because the actual alterations to Chiang's 1967 version--which was itself apparently a substantial rewriting job--were very slight.\*

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\* The changes were discussed in the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA, 18 December 1969, p.31.

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The revision did, however, serve to give propagandists an opportunity to devote expansive praise to the PLA and to present a heroic Lin Piao-type model to dominate the PRC's 20th anniversary celebrations. The fall of 1969 was the period of the height of the Lin cult, when there were frequent references to him and quotations from his writings in the media.

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## YUGOSLAVIA

## PURGE OF CROATIAN PARTY LEADERS SPARKS NEW ZAGREB DISORDERS

A sweeping purge of Croatian political figures and further moves against Croatian nationalist elements came to a head on 12 December, sparking new disturbances in Zagreb, in the wake of Tito's public attack against the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) party leadership on 1 December for tolerating "counter-revolutionary" nationalist manifestations.

At an LCC plenum on the 12th, according to TANJUG, several key Croatian party leaders announced their "resignations from all functions and duties in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY]." Among them were LCC President Dabcevic-Kucar, LCC Secretary Pero Pirker, and LCC Executive Bureau member Marko Koprtla.\* Most notably, they included Miko Tripalo, member of the federal party Executive Bureau and of the federal presidency and second-ranking Croatian communist leader. Vladimir Bakaric, Croatia's top party leader and member of the LCY Presidium's Executive Bureau, survived the purge unscathed.

Also on the 12th, Radio Zagreb reported that President Tito had personally "suspended" Lt. Gen. Janko Bobetko, a member of the LCC Central Committee, from his post in the Yugoslav army pending an investigation into his responsibility for political activity in Croatia. And on the same day the radio announced the resignation of the entire board of the nationalistic cultural organization "Matic Hrvatska"--an organization Tito had singled out for attack in his 1 December speech to the LCY Presidium.

The leaders of the recent Zagreb student strike were arrested on the 12th for "unconstitutional" political activity, according to TANJUG, in what seemed a clear effort to forestall organized student support for the popular deposed leaders. But Yugoslav media reported that student protests against the arrests and the purge broke out on the same day and escalated into riots in Zagreb's public square on the 13th and 14th.

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\* TANJUG reported that the plenum on the following day elected Mrs. Milka Planinc to replace the ousted party president, Josip Vrhovec to be party secretary, and Milik Miskovic to the LCC Executive Bureau.

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Tito's decision to revert to hardline "administrative" tactics, with the attendant risk of further alienating the youth, appears to reflect mounting concern that nationalism in Croatia--despite his repeated earlier warnings about its dangers--was getting out of hand and that such manifestations as the Zagreb student strike could spread to other republics. The purge of Dabcevic-Kucar and the liberal intellectual Tripalo serves as a warning to other republican party leaders to put their houses in order or risk the same fate as the ousted Croatian leaders.

LCC PLENUM            In her speech to the Croatian Central Committee  
RESIGNATIONS        plenum on the 12th, Dabcevic-Kucar said that she  
                      and Pero Pirker assumed responsibility for lack  
of "vigilance" against nationalist manifestations as well as for  
"the disunity" within the League of Communists of Croatia.  
Revealingly, she noted that she had "informed" President Tito  
of her decision to resign on 9 December and that the LCC Central  
Committee--which elected her and was in effect conveniently  
bypassed when the "resignations" took place--was told of her  
contemplated step on the 10th. Although Dabcevic-Kucar was  
vague on the genesis of her decision, it appears to have been  
prompted by the 22d plenary meeting of the LCY Presidium on  
the 9th. TANJUG's account of the plenum said she was a  
participant in debates.

Following his attack on the Croatian leaders at the 21st LCY  
Presidium plenum of 1-2 December, Tito had apparently been  
persuaded to leave it to the Croatian Central Committee for  
the time being to cope with its own problems; the Presidium's  
formal conclusions, while expressing full support for Tito's  
harsh assessment of Croatian events, nevertheless expressed  
confidence in the Croatian party leaders' ability to take  
remedial action.\* But the reluctance of the Croatian communist  
leaders to attack the nationalist elements with sufficient  
zeal, in apparent hopes of riding out the storm as they had  
successfully done in the past, prompted a meeting of the LCY  
Executive Bureau on the 8th and the reconvening of the LCY  
Presidium in plenary session the next day.

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\* For an account of these developments, see the TRENDS of  
8 December, pages 39-43.

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TANJUG's account of the Executive Bureau meeting noted that Tito attended and that the participants criticized "hesitation and inconsistency" in implementation of the 21st plenum's decisions. Noting that the LCY Presidium had demonstrated "trust" in the Croatian party, the report said the Executive Bureau urged that the next session of the LCC Central Committee reassess the conduct of its members and warned that the LCY would "continue to follow the course of implementation of the conclusions."

A TANJUG report of the next day's 22d plenum debate noted that some speakers warned against efforts by unnamed party officials to "water down" the conclusions of the 21st plenum. Such efforts, the report said, were causing "confusion and indecisiveness." More specifically, TANJUG quoted one speaker as rebuking the normally vocal Miko Tripalo for failing to make his position clear and for failing to accept responsibility for recent developments in Croatia.

Following the 21st plenum, Tripalo had conspicuously refrained from endorsing Tito's assessment of the student strike and nationalist manifestations in Croatia. According to the TANJUG account of Tripalo's letter of resignation, addressed to Tito and read to the LCC plenum on 12 December, the deposed party official accepted the LCY Presidium's charges of "insufficient resolve and liberalism toward nationalism" but "like the other officials, he emphasized that he rejected any allusion to alleged collusion with any antisocialist forces." An indication that Tripalo may be less repentant than the rest of the purged officials seemed reflected in a speech by Vladimir Bakaric to the LCC plenum on the 12th. Bakaric praised Dabcevic-Kucar and Pirker for their "mature" decision to resign in the interests of party unity and said that in the past they had "conscientiously resolved many problems"; but he conspicuously failed to mention Tripalo, his former colleague on the LCY Executive Bureau.

In the aftermath of the 2d LCY Presidium plenum, Yugoslav media seemed at pains to underscore adherence to democratic procedures. They portrayed a groundswell of demands from local party and other organizations for the ouster of the Croatian leaders whose resignations were to be announced on the 12th. For example, TANJUG reported on the 10th--two days before the announcements of the resignations--that a group of Croatian veterans had demanded that "Dabcevic-Kucar, Miko Tripalo, and Pero Pirker bear responsibility for the

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existing situation in Croatia." Other groups were reported to have called for the removal of lesser figures who also duly submitted their resignations.

LCC PLENUM           The LCC Central Committee plenum conclusions,  
CONCLUSIONS       released on the 14th, predictably called for an intensified struggle against nationalism and chauvinism, urging communists throughout the republic "to undertake organization normalization and ideological adjustment to eliminate weaknesses." In a gesture of conciliation toward the ousted leaders, the plenum concluded that "those who have realized their errors should be enabled to take part in the realization of the tasks and policy of the LCC." It also called on the students to live up to their responsibilities and warned them against being taken in by student groups representing "alien" ideologies.

STUDENT             TANJUG reports indicate that Zagreb University  
PROTESTS           students began demonstrating in support for Dabcevic-Kucar and Tripalo before the LCC Central Committee session opened. One report said that prior to the plenum opening, Zagreb students climbed the roofs of their dormitories and shouted "slogans expressing support for Dabcevic-Kucar and Miko Tripalo." A report on the 13th said 27 people were arrested in Zagreb for "violating public order."

An announcement by the Secretariat of Public Security on the 14th acknowledged that 400 "troublemakers" had "seriously violated public order" in Zagreb's public square, in a demonstration on the 13th. The report said that the demonstrators, who were chanting "Cicak-Budisa!" (two of the arrested student leaders), were dispersed and 76 of their number arrested following an attack on the police. A Radio Zagreb account of the riot said that 500 people participated, shouting slogans in support of Dabcevic-Kucar and Miko Tripalo as well as for the arrested students.

According to TANJUG, disturbances broke out again on the 14th, resulting in 93 arrests. TANJUG said that about 400 rioters "interrupted public transport, challenged passers-by, and attacked and provoked security forces while chanting hostile and chauvinistic slogans." A statement issued by the Secretariat of Public Security on the 15th acknowledged that "some means of force were also applied to innocent citizens" in the course of police attempts to quell the riots on the 12th, 13th, and 14th.

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## POLISH CONGRESS

### PARTY STRENGTHENS LIBERAL IMAGE, STRESSES LOYALTY TO MOSCOW

The Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) ended its 6-11 December sixth congress on an effusive note of fealty to the Soviets, exemplified in the closing speech by re-elected First Secretary Gierek and underscored in editorials in TRYBUNA LUDU and Moscow's PRAVDA. At the same time, there appears to be little to gratify Moscow in the liberalized image projected by the Polish party. The PZPR emerged from the congress with a program heavily committed to improve the low standard of living in an economy still featuring overwhelmingly private production in agriculture and the suspect "workers' self-management" system in industry.

The congress carried forward the already considerable moves toward liberalization in the party's leading bodies. Conservative figures Cyrankiewicz, Jedrychowski, and Moczar were dropped from the Politburo. Jablonski, Jagielski, and Defense Minister Jaruzelski were promoted from candidate to full Politburo membership, and Interior Minister Szlachcic--who had emerged with a favorable image from the December crisis--was also added to the Politburo. The status of Cyrankiewicz and Jedrychowski as State Council chairman and foreign minister, respectively, will presumably be determined shortly at meetings of governmental bodies. The party Secretariat was enlarged from seven to 12 members by the addition of Szlachcic, among others. The newly elected 115-member Central Committee includes only 47 who were previously full members; another 24 were promoted from the previous candidate list, and 44 of the full members are new.

**GIEREK SPEECH** At the windup of the congress on the 11th, Gierek offered strong reassurances of the PZPR's orthodoxy, stressing its "intransigent attitude toward tendencies alien to socialism, its unflinching fidelity to the invincible principles of Marxism-Leninism." In deepening "socialist democracy," he added, the PZPR would "increase social discipline" and strengthen the socialist state. He went on to pledge "unflinching" fidelity to proletarian internationalism and said Poland would be "an unfailing link of the socialist community and the world anti-imperialist front." The Polish party's "ideological community" with the CPSU and the two countries' friendship, he said, were unbreakable.

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At the same time, Gierek took a further swipe at Gomulka's authoritarian style of leadership in stressing his party's rejection of "the deformation in the methods of leadership" and enunciated anew his liberalized concept of the party's leading role based on consultation with the rank and file: "The supreme principle" of the party's leading bodies, he declared, "will be the links with you, comrades, the activists of our party. When fulfilling our duties, we will consult with the whole party." Such policies, he insisted, constitute "restored Leninist principles" and "a Marxist-Leninist line."

EDITORIALS      TRYBUNA LUDU on the 13th, in an editorial on the congress, took a more disciplined view of the party's leading role: While stressing "the expansion of its function in the service of the working class," it called for full observance of the principles of democratic centralism, "which guarantee the harmonizing of discussion with action, collective decision-making with personal responsibility." The editorial stressed the importance of the Soviet-Polish alliance and the results of the 24th CPSU Congress and welcomed the "high appraisal" of the PZPR's policies and of Gierek's leadership in the address delivered by Brezhnev on the 7th.

PRAVDA's 13 December editorial on the Polish congress, entitled "Loyalty to the Ideals of Socialism," pointedly recalled Brezhnev's remark in his congress speech that "we communists are answerable for the fate of our country, for the correct progress" of socialist development and that responsibility for overcoming difficulties rests with "the ruling communist parties." It further echoed Brezhnev in praising the PZPR's "principled and courageous approach" to overcoming "the negative manifestations" and, on the score of the adopted party program, linked "improvement of the people's well-being" with "strengthening the positions of socialism in the country." PRAVDA also noted that Gierek had said in his main congress report that "the boundlessly rich and creative decisions of the 24th congress of the Leninist party were used by the PZPR when formulating the program for the further socialist development of Poland."

WHEREABOUTS      There was no report of Brezhnev's whereabouts  
OF BREZHNEV      or activities in communist media during the  
                         period between his speech at the Polish  
congress on the morning of 7 December and his attendance at a  
meeting on the 11th between the Polish party leaders and the

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foreign party delegations. The silence on Brezhnev's whereabouts, coupled with Kosygin's return home from Norway on the 7th--two days earlier than scheduled--suggests the possibility that a top-level meeting of Soviet policymakers on the Indian-Pakistani crisis was held during that period. Polish media and a correspondents' report in the Moscow domestic service on the 8th reported a speech that day by the second-ranking member of the CPSU delegation, Politburo candidate member Masherov, at the Mazowsze Petrochemical Combine in Plock--one of the usual visits by foreign delegation leaders following their speeches at party congresses. The fullest available version of Masherov's speech, in the Warsaw domestic service, quoted him as speaking "on behalf of the delegation of the CPSU"; it included a reference to Brezhnev's speech at the Polish congress, but none of the reports explained the Soviet leader's absence from the Plock meeting.

On the 11th, PAP reported Brezhnev's toast at the reception with the Polish leaders in Warsaw that day, spoken "on behalf of the nearly 70 delegations" of the visiting parties. The media reported his departure for home by rail on the 11th and his arrival in Moscow the next day, where he was met by a long list of top leaders, including Kosygin and Podgornyy. PRAVDA on the 9th and 11th published roundups of worldwide favorable reaction to Brezhnev's 7 December speech. The 11 December issue also carried on the front page a photo of Brezhnev standing between Gierek and Honecker, with no indication of when the picture was taken.

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## FRG - POLAND

## WARSAW-BONN PACT CALLED "CHAPTER" OF "PEACE TREATY"

The Polish press has used the first anniversary, on 7 December, of the signing of the FRG-Polish treaty to advance the concept of an imminent final settlement of postwar European territorial issues--a figurative "peace treaty" in which the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn and the Big Four accord on "West Berlin" are the "basic chapters." Articles on the 7th in the Catholic daily SLOWO POWSZECHNE and on the 14th in the Polish Government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY both went beyond prior propaganda from the Soviet bloc in spelling out the notion that what is now in the offing is a de facto German peace treaty that will legalize the permanence of the postwar status quo in Europe.

Calling the Warsaw-Bonn treaty a "breakthrough" in the relations between Bonn and the socialist bloc, the SLOWO POWSZECHNE article described "the whole series of already concluded or quickly ripening agreements"--from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty to the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn, the four-power accord on "West Berlin," the subsequent "agreements between the two German states," and the talks between Bonn and Prague--as removing, "section by section, all the basic ingredients of the historical dispute over Germany."

Poland's concern about its security interests, expressed clearly and repeatedly in Polish media in the period since the signing of the four-power agreement, was reflected in the Catholic paper's article. It pointed out that the recognition of existing borders and of the existence of two German states, as well as "the barring of the Germans from gaining access to nuclear weapons," are in fact "the basic chapters of the peace treaty" and signposts of "the closing of the postwar epoch in Europe, stage by stage." The "new epoch" would be opened with the convening of a European security conference, the paper said.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 14th, pointing to the GDR-FRG transit agreement as the first between the governments of the two German states, declared that "we are coming nearer to the legal-international settlement of the 'German issue.'" As quoted by PAP, the article also called the transit agreement "the first step" toward recognition of the GDR by the FRG

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under international law, a sine qua non for the development of other "processes of vital importance for relations between the East and West."

Both papers went beyond Brezhnev's presentation, in his 7 December speech to the Polish party congress, of progress toward bringing "the postwar period of European development to an end" and laying the basis for "Europe's transition to a new historical phase which we believe will develop under the sign of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation." Brezhnev took note of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties with Bonn, the "West Berlin" agreement, and the ensuing inner-German phase of negotiations as moves in that direction. He cited the need for GDR and FRG membership in the United Nations but did not specifically call for West German recognition of GDR sovereignty under international law, and he expressed "hope" that Prague and Bonn would be able to settle "the problems existing between them." The Polish press articles, more sweeping and less cautious in their prognosis of a de facto "peace treaty," seemed in tune with the spirit if not the letter of these remarks.

#### POLAND REACTS TO FRG CHARGES ON GERMAN RESETTLEMENT ISSUE

West German press comment impugning Polish good will in carrying out the "family reunion" program, the program for resettlement in the FRG of ethnic Germans still residing in the former German lands east of the Oder-Neisse and in East Prussia, has drawn heated rebuttals in the Polish press. Articles in both the party's TRYBUNA LUDU and the government's ZYCIE WARSZAWY have been at pains to underscore the point that Poland has undertaken the repatriation efforts of its own volition, out of humanitarian motives and to show good will in the matter of normalizing relations with the FRG, and that complaints about Poland's conduct of the program are tantamount to an affront against Polish sovereignty.

In the recent press articles, as in past references to the program in Polish media, there was no acknowledgment of the fact that a formal understanding on the program was reached at the time the FRG-Polish treaty was signed in December 1970. But the articles were at pains to document Poland's readiness to do its part in normalizing bilateral relations despite the fact that the Polish-FRG treaty remains unratified a year after its signing.

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Registering Poland's sensitivity on the matter of its sovereignty, the more recent of the two articles, by the authoritative foreign affairs commentator Ryszard Wojna in ZYCIE WARSZAWY on 5 December, insisted that all decisions regarding the family reunification program are "exclusively dependent on the sovereign Polish Government" and that the question of the status of Polish citizens is a matter solely for the Polish Government to decide, "not one of coordination with the FRG."

In the process of documenting Polish good will, both articles were notably revealing of the scope of the repatriation program--a sensitive, emotionally charged subject seldom discussed in Polish media. TRYBUNA LUDU's article on 27 November recalled that repatriation had in fact been going on for more than two decades. It said that some 250,000 people had left Poland for the FRG in the fifties and another 150,000 in the sixties. In a slap at the former CDU/CSU governments in Bonn, it remarked that "these moves never met with the least positive response on the part of the FRG." Despite this lack of response by Brandt's predecessors, it continued, Poland "agreed to comply with the Brandt government's request to consider the application of persons who, as described by the West German side, have expressed the wish to leave Poland 'as a result of' changed family conditions or a change of mind." Departures consequently increased in early 1971, the paper said, and reached a total for the year of more than 20,000 people by the end of October.

The TRYBUNA LUDU article appeared a week after West German Red Cross Secretary General Kurt Wagner had been in Poland for discussion of the current family reunion program, administered by Red Cross representatives of the two countries. And the Wojna article was directly responsive to subsequent West German radio commentaries based on statements by West German Red Cross representatives "who recently held talks with the Polish Red Cross" on the family reunion program--an evident allusion to Wagner. Stopping short of aiming the criticism directly at Wagner or the West German Red Cross, the article said the West German commentaries either were based on erroneous information or were indulging in "intentional ambiguities" in order "to blur the essentially clear results" of the Red Cross talks.

Echoing TRYBUNA LUDU on the fruits of the Polish efforts undertaken unilaterally out of humanitarian motives over the last two decades, Wojna also cited--without attribution--statistics on the recent repatriation efforts which Wagner

had given in an interview over the West German radio on 26 November: Some 26,000 Germans would be resettled this year, and an average of 4,000 a month would be resettled in 1972. Wojna added that, in addition, "several thousand" people are leaving Poland for the GDR: "The problem of reunifying families . . . applies to people of German origin in general, and therefore to the populations living in both German states."

Both the TRYBUNA LUDU and the ZYCIE WARSZAWY articles ascribed criticism of the Polish effort to West German opposition elements bent on blocking the progress of FRG-Polish normalization and trying to pressure Brandt into further stalling ratification of the FRG-Polish treaty. Wojna said Poland appreciated the difficulties faced by the FRG Government because of the narrowness of the Brandt-Scheel majority in the Bundestag; Warsaw, he said, had sought to demonstrate its good will by making family reunions possible without waiting for ratification of the Polish-FRG treaty. To the West German charges of Polish ill will, Wojna countercharged that West German elements' efforts to "misuse our good will" are contrary to the spirit and letter of West German assurances at the time the bilateral treaty was signed in December 1970.

Unacknowledged in Polish media was a public discussion of the German resettlement issue over the West German radio on 26 November, the day before the TRYBUNA LUDU article appeared, by Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz--in Bonn to give a lecture to a West German foreign affairs organization. The West German DPA quoted him as pledging that "we will keep our word" but that resettlement posed difficult organizational problems requiring patience and tact.

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## NATO COUNCIL SESSION

### USSR IN STEREOTYPED ATTACK DECRIES "COLD WAR" PHILOSOPHY

A low volume of Moscow propaganda on the 9-10 December NATO Council session in Brussels and the preliminary meetings on the 7th and 8th follows a familiar script in claiming sharp disunity among NATO members and in indicting the organization for its "cold war" philosophy. Thus the TASS account of the 10 December communique on the session said that the document dealt in "time-worn allegations" about the intensification of Soviet military efforts and the worldwide character of Soviet naval operations.

Secretary Laird is typically a target of criticism. A TASS report on the 8 December meeting of the Defense Planning Committee, for example, said Laird's call for a further buildup of NATO naval strength in the Mediterranean "intensified the atmosphere of distrust and tension." And a TASS report noted his "satisfaction" over the decision of the 10-nation "Eurogroup," meeting on the 7th, to increase military budgets in 1972 by a billion dollars.

EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE      The differences among NATO members manifested themselves most acutely, according to Moscow, over the question of a European security conference, a question the Council was "compelled" to consider. Remarks by commentator Polyanov, participating in the 12 December domestic service commentators' roundtable show, typify this propaganda: Polyanov said two sides emerged clearly at the Council session, the group of the "so-called Atlanticists" headed by the United States, which sought to delay preparations for a European security conference, and "an ever growing group" including France, Norway, and Denmark that favored the convening of a conference "as soon as possible." In the most authoritative comment to date on the Brussels gathering, a 14 December PRAVDA article by Mayevskiy, reviewed by TASS, took the United States and Britain to task for raising obstacles to a conference and for hoping to turn it into a meeting between opposing blocs, "in practice leaving no room for neutral and nonaligned countries."

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The TASS report of the NATO Council communique and ensuing radio comment noted that the document again made convocation of a European security conference dependent on the final conclusion of the agreements on Berlin. But the TASS English report also mentioned that the NATO governments "approved" the November 1970 Finnish proposal for the opening of multilateral negotiations preparatory to a conference among heads of missions accredited to Helsinki.\* A commentary by Levin in the domestic service on the 11th stated that the NATO representatives, in a departure from the language of past communiques, have declared their readiness to begin multilateral talks aimed at convening a conference and have not set preliminary conditions for the inception of preparatory talks. The commentator tempered his optimism, however, by observing that "one can still read conditions between the lines"; he cited REUTER for the statement that NATO continues to hold that preparatory talks can begin "only after the coming into force of the agreement on West Berlin."

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\* The English-language text of the NATO communique in fact said that the governments "appreciated" the Finnish proposal; the French version said they were "favorable" toward it.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW ASSAILS ISRAELI, U.S., CHINESE STANDS ON MIDEAST

Diminishing Soviet comment on the Middle East\* continues to hold Israel, together with its "patron" the United States, responsible for the impasse in Ambassador Jarring's mission and for the failure to implement Security Council Resolution 242. Again stressing Cairo's "peace-loving line" and readiness for a political settlement, Moscow characteristically portrays Israeli Prime Minister Meir's U.S. visit as strengthening Israel's militaristic stance, with Washington's support.

Moscow also attacks Peking's "most improper" stand on the Middle East question. TASS on the 14th, for example, reporting on UNGA adoption of the Afro-Asian resolution on the Middle East, pointed out that the Chinese, "in the same camp with the sworn enemies" of the national liberation movement, had abstained along with the United States, Israel, and six other states. On this score, Moscow has for some months been rebutting, in Mandarin broadcasts, Chinese charges that the USSR is selling out the Arabs by colluding--and contending--with the United States in the region. Currently, Moscow broadcasts in Arabic reiterate previous Soviet protestations to Arab audiences of the purity of Moscow's aims in supporting the Arabs and swipe at the "propaganda ambitions and selfish aims" of Peking's policies in the region.

Moscow has for the first time directly addressed the question of Chinese participation in the hitherto "Big Four" discussions on the Middle East. Soviet delegate Malik, in his UNGA speech reported by TASS on the 10th, pressed for resumption of the Jarring mission and called for resumption of the consultations of "the permanent members of the Security Council." A Sturua dispatch from New York in the 11 December IZVESTIYA accused the United States of paralyzing the Jarring mission and blocking

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\* Soviet attention to the Middle East, just three percent of total comment in the week of 22 November, the anniversary of Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, dropped to a mere 1.4 percent of total comment in the week ending 12 December despite the intermittent UNGA debate, which has been interrupted by the Indian-Pakistani crisis.

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the work of "the four" permanent Security Council members. But Sturua went on to complain that not only is the United States opposing resumption of these meetings, but "another permanent Security Council member--the PRC--is altogether refusing to participate in the consultations and to promote the success of the Jarring "mission." Reaffirming "broad" Soviet assistance to the Arabs, Sturua reiterated the USSR's readiness to participate, "together with the other powers which are permanent members of the Security Council," in creating international guarantees for a political settlement.

#### SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS

While Moscow continues officially to play up an image of a peace-loving Egypt and to brand Israel as the aggressor blocking a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, a trial balloon on the possibility of the establishment of Soviet and Israeli interest sections in respective caretaker embassies--the Dutch in Moscow and the Finnish in Tel Aviv--has been unofficially floated by Soviet journalist Victor Louis. The London EVENING NEWS reported on the 13th that Louis, its "well-informed correspondent in Moscow," reported that current Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel "might require" some Israeli diplomats in the Dutch embassy in Moscow and Russian diplomats in the Finnish embassy in Tel Aviv. The story was also reported by Jerusalem radio the same day, citing an "exclusive report" to the Israeli paper YEDIOT AHAARONOT. While Soviet propaganda has become slightly less reticent on the subject of Soviet Jewish emigration in the past several months, Moscow has not acknowledged Israeli press speculation and official denials of Soviet-Israeli contacts, and it ignored reports of Louis' June visit to Israel. Soviet media did, however, exploit the visit in early September of a "group of progressive Israeli public figures" in the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace.

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## TOPIC IN BRIEF

### GERMAN CP

The 6-11 December Polish United Workers Party Congress produced yet another indication that the illegal Communist Party of Germany (KPD) has for all practical purposes become inoperative. Polish First Secretary Gierek made no reference to the KPD in listing the foreign parties represented at the congress, mentioning only the DKP delegation led by Chairman Kurt Bachmann. Gierek's listing accorded with PAP's roster of the 70 foreign delegations attending. KPD as well as DKP delegations had been present earlier this year at the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and East German party congresses.

The de facto death knell of the KPD had been sounded in late September when KPD First Secretary Max Reimann announced his decision to join the DKP, stating that he now belonged to that party alone while claiming that this did not mean a replacement of the KPD by the legal DKP.\*

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\* For background see the TRENDS of 1 December 1971, pages 24-27.

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